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Abstract
We present the preliminary design of a programming model for building reliable sys-
tems with distributed state from collections of potentially unreliable components.
Our transactor model provides constructs for maintaining consistency among the
states of distributed components. Our intention is that transactors should sup-
port key aspects of both traditional distributed transactions, e.g., for electronic
commerce, and systems with weaker consistency requirements, e.g., peer-to-peer
ﬁle- and process-sharing systems. In this paper, we motivate the need for language
support for maintenance of distributed state, describe the design goals for the trans-
actor model, provide an operational semantics for a simple transactor calculus, and
provide several examples of applications of the transactor model in a higher-level
language.
1 Introduction
Many distributed systems must maintain distributed state. By this, we mean
that the states of several distributed components in a network-connected sys-
tem are interdependent on one another. The classical example of such a sce-
nario is a bank transaction involving the transfer of money from one account
to another, where we must ensure that it is not possible (even in the presence
of a system failure) for one account to be debited without a corresponding
credit being made to the other account, and vice-versa.
Ensuring that these interrelated states are maintained in a consistent way
in a wide-area network—where transmission latencies may be high, and where
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node and link failures are relatively common occurrences—is diﬃcult. Tradi-
tionally, distributed state maintenance has been viewed primarily as a systems
or “middleware” [5] problem, in which, e.g., system infrastructure for message-
passing provides guaranteed message delivery on an unreliable network sub-
strate [6,25], or where distributed databases or transaction systems support
the illusion of shared, atomically-updatable state across multiple nodes [17,22].
However, in an open and heterogeneous world—where software components
are designed and implemented independently, and where they connect to one
another ﬂuidly—it is unrealistic to assume the existence of common system
infrastructure for distributed state maintenance. While a system-neutral API
for distributed transaction management exists [21], it provides support only
for a single, rigid consistency model.
Consider a collection of distributed components that engage in a protracted
negotiation toward some mutually-desirable outcome (e.g., an auction). The
negotiation process will entail sending messages among the components, and
updating each component’s state in various ways during that time. If the
negotiation is successful, that subset of the components that have reached an
agreement will want to ensure that each of their states consistently reﬂects
the agreed upon outcome; if the negotiation fails, there is typically no need
to ensure that the states are mutually consistent at the end of the negotiation
process, provided that each participant has reached a satisfactory local state.
Distributed transaction management systems typically require that all of
the participants in the transaction coordinate their work with a pre-designated
transaction manager, and that every transaction has well-deﬁned beginning
and end points. These properties make it diﬃcult to build open distributed
systems where the topology of the system is determined dynamically, where
the scope of—and even the need for—a transaction is situation-dependent, and
where transactional and non-transactional components can easily interact.
In this paper, we present preliminary work on what we will call the trans-
actor programming model. The transactor model allows separately-developed
distributed components to be dynamically combined, but supports mainte-
nance of consistent distributed state for those components that require it. The
transactor model is based on the actor model introduced by Hewitt [15], and
further reﬁned and developed by Agha et al. [4,3,24]. Actors are inherently
independent, concurrent, and autonomous which enables eﬃciency in parallel
execution [16] and facilitates mobility [2,1]. The actor model and languages
provide a very useful framework for understanding and implementing open
distributed systems.
Transactors can be regarded as a coordination model [12,13,26,8,14,9], in
the sense that they are intended primarily to express the semantics of the
interactions among various distributed components, rather than to describe
the computations local to a node in the system.
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1.1 Design Desiderata
The design desiderata for the transactor model are as follows:
• The model should allow arbitrary collections of concurrent processes, which
may be interconnected in a dynamically-updatable topology.
• The model should expose the possibility of network link and node failures
to the programmer, and thus allow the component’s responsibilities and
guarantees in the presence of failure to be made explicit.
• The model should not require an omniscient central coordinating entity to
implement.
• Communication should be based on message-passing, not shared memory.
• The model should incorporate explicit support for stable state checkpoints
and rollback, to allow computations that have become inconsistent, have
failed, or have resulted in a runtime error to recover in a consistent state.
• The model should incorporate a mechanism for discovering and reacting to
state inconsistency.
An important transactor design principle is to avoid requiring that any
component of a system implement more than a minimal set of primitives
needed to allow composite systems to be built at all. For example, we would
like to avoid requiring that every component of a composite system necessarily
be able to participate in a distributed 2-phase commit protocol, yet we would
like to be able to take advantage of components that provide such guaran-
tees. Moreover, we wish to be able to combine both high- and low-reliability
components, reason about the behavior of the composite system, and supply
additional software layers to improve its reliability if desired.
By exposing key semantic concepts related to maintenance of distributed
state in a common, well-founded language, rather than relegating these issues
to system or middleware, composite distributed applications can reason about
the failure semantics of their components, and, if appropriate, supply extra
protocol layers (e.g., logging, rollbacks, retries, replication, etc.) to add ad-
ditional reliability. Use of a common interconnection language also facilitates
testing, porting, and simulating of internet-scale software, something that is
currently extremely diﬃcult to do without deploying a full-blown production
system.
1.2 Related Work
While there is much existing foundational work on languages for concur-
rent, and to a lesser extent, distributed systems (e.g., actors [4,3], the π-
calculus [18], the join calculus [11], and mobile ambients [7]), we are not aware
of formalisms that provide primitives for reasoning about the consistency of
distributed state in the presence of failures. At the other end of the spectrum,
distribution in “industrial” languages or language models, e.g., Java RMI [23]
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and Jini [27], CORBA [19], and COM+, is generally based on remote proce-
dure call models that have limited mechanisms for dealing with failure, and
are best suited for tightly-coupled, centrally-managed applications.
Liskov’s Argus language [17], is the work closest in spirit to ours. It incor-
porates constructs for maintenance of distributed state (via nested transac-
tions). Liskov introduced two principal abstractions: guardians and actions.
A guardian is an abstract object whose purpose is to encapsulate a resource
or resources. Special procedures, called handlers, can be used to access a
guardian. An action is essentially a nested atomic transaction. Argus pro-
vides a programming interface onto centrally-managed nested transactions.
By contrast, with transactors, we intend to uniformly model a variety of
failure-management techniques, including transactions and applications with
weaker consistency semantics.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, Section 2 gives a
high-level description of the transactor model, and illustrates the model using a
simple persistent Counter example with synchronized access. Next, Section 3
provides an operational semantics for a lambda-based functional transactor
language. Following, Section 4 describes an electronic commerce example
involving a distributed transaction. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of
open questions and future work.
2 The Transactor Model
Transactors are deﬁned using the following core primitives and assumptions:
• Transactors can respond to asynchronous messages by creating new transac-
tors, sending messages to other known transactors, or changing their internal
state (these are the core concepts of the actor model [4]).
• Messages are not guaranteed to arrive to target transactors. However, if a
message arrives, it does not arrive corrupt.
• A transactor may decide to commit its current state to a stable state. When
a transactor becomes stable, its state will not change in future communica-
tions. The transactor may fail to respond to messages if its node is down,
or the network is partitioned; however, when the node comes back up, or
the network gets reconnected, the transactor will appear at its stable state.
• When an unstable transactor decides to roll-back, or is required to roll-
back by its run-time system, new messages from that transactor will trigger
roll-back behavior for transactors whose state depended on the state of the
unstable transactor.
An important characteristic of our reasoning framework is its layered ar-
chitecture. We do not assume that the network is reliable. That is, we do not
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// Counter:
//
// Implements synchronized and persistent access to a
// counter value as a chain of stable (committed)
// transactors. All read or write requests are
// forwarded to the last stable transactor in the chain.
// All writes are required to be ‘‘stabilizable’’, in the
// sense that the sender of the write request must
// itself be stable, thus assuring permanence of the
// written value. A write request by an unstable
// transactor will fail.
//
transactor Counter(int init_value) {
int current_value = init_value;
// non-Null if this counter is stable (i.e., has been
// committed); end of chain of transactors rooted at
// next_val yields last committed value
Counter next_val = Null;
// read(requester):
//
// sends a message to requester with latest stable
// (committed) value for counter
//
read(CounterReader requester) {
if ( volatility == stable ) then
// this value is stable (committed);
// see if other committed values exist
next_val.read(requester);
else
// first non-committed value, which (by convention)
// must be equal to last committed value
requester.returnedVal(current_value);
}
// incr():
//
// increments latest stable (committed) value of
// counter by incr_value and attempts to commit by
// stabilizing; stabilization will only succeed if
// sender is itself stable; otherwise, the transactor
// will roll back.
//
incr(int incr_value) {
if ( volatility == stable ) then
// this value has been committed - can’t update;
// find uncommitted value in chain
next_val.incr(incr_value)
else {
// this value is uncommitted; attempt to update
// and commit
current_value = current_value + incr_value;
// spawn new transactor to handle subsequent
// requests
next_val = new Counter(current_value);
// attempt to stabilize; if stabilization fails
// because sender is unstable, rollback to
// previous value
stabilize;
if ( volatility != stable )
rollback;
}
}
Fig. 1. A simple transactor implementing synchronized, persistent access to a
counter.
assume guaranteed message delivery, or synchronous channel name passing.
Libraries that provide stronger semantic guarantees that the basic transactor
model can be deﬁned if required.
The goal is to provide a completely decentralized and distributed weak
consistency protocol. Applications requiring stronger semantic properties will
trigger validation algorithms to reach the desired consistency semantic guaran-
tees. Locally persistent state is provided as a primitive to transactors wishing
to stabilize. Roll-back behavior is also supported by persistent intermediate
checkpoints, transparent to applications.
The transactor model admits a number of programming language real-
izations. In examples in the sequel, we will use a realization that has an
object-based ﬂavor.
2.1 A Transactor Example
Figure 1 depicts the deﬁnition of Counter, a very simple transactor. While
this example does not illustrate the full power of the transactor model in a
distributed setting, it does cover several of the ideas underlying transactors.
The Counter transactor implements synchronized and persistent access to a
counter value. It is synchronized, in the sense that the counter is incremented
atomically. It is persistent, in the sense that readers of the counter will never
read a value that may be subsequently rolled back or corrupted by failure,
although the counter may become inaccessible due to network failures, and
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other writers may subsequently update it.
Like conventional objects, the Counter transactor has ﬁelds representing
the current state of the transactor. However, unlike regular objects, access is
implicitly protected and synchronized:
• a transactor’s state may only be accessed via a message processor (which
resembles a method, but is invoked asynchronously and therfore does not
explicitly “return”).
• only one message processor may be active at a time, and must complete
before another message may be processed.
• multiple message processor invocations (i.e., “message sends”) on the same
transactor are implicitly queued, and processed one at a time.
Since message processors are not methods, a message processor such as
read that is intended to return a value must take as an argument a transactor
(which here is deemed to have type CounterReader) to receive the returned
value. Message sending is asynchronous, that is, the sender does not wait for
any acknowledgment before continuing processing. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee of message delivery. Both synchronous invocation and guaranteed
delivery can be provided as higher-level abstractions.
The most notable aspect of Counter is the fact that it maintains a chain
of stable (i.e., committed) transactor values, rather than a single value. While
this may seem to be an egregious waste for such a simple example, it illustrates
a general transactor programming principle: each distinct transactional “unit
of work” (here, a single invocation of the incr message processor) corresponds
to a distinct transactor.
The stabilize keyword in the incr message processor requires some elab-
oration: this construct “commits” a transactor’s state by ensuring that each
sender of a message to the transactor that has updated the transactor’s state
(in the Counter example, this would be any invocation of the incr message
processor) is itself stable. Once a transactor is stable, attempts to invoke
any message processor that can mutate the transactor’s state are ignored. In
general, an attempt to stabilize a transactor may fail, since it requires that
the set of all senders of mutating messages must also be stable. In the case of
Counter, failure to stabilize results in rollback of the transactor. In general,
such rollbacks may trigger rollbacks in other transactors with which a trans-
actor has communicated. In the case of Counter, however, such cascading
rollbacks cannot occur.
In order to support stabilization of mutually dependent transactors, we
introduce a quiesce primitive. A transactor in the quiescent state can still
send and receive messages, but it makes a promise not to change its state
unless it is forcibly rolled back due to receipt of a message from a partner
transactor with which it had previously communicated, but which has since
rolled back transactor. The quiescent state is persistent, in the sense that it
can be recovered after a temporary failure such as a hardware reboot.
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3 Toward a Formal Operational Semantics
The example in 2.1 was written in a loosely deﬁned language with an object-
oriented ﬂavor. To make the concepts of the transactor model precise, we
modify the formal semantics of actors formulated by Agha, Mason, Smith and
Talcott [3]. The following two subsections introduce a transactor calculus and
its operational semantics. In this paper, we will not deﬁne a formal translation
from the high-level language used in the examples to the lower-level calculus;
doing so would be tedious but not diﬃcult.
3.1 A Simple Lambda Based Transactor Calculus
Our transactor calculus is a simple extension of the call-by-value lambda calcu-
lus that includes—in addition to arithmetic primitives and structure construc-
tors, recognizers, and destructors—primitives for creating and manipulating
transactors. A transactor’s behavior is described by a closure which embodies
the code to be executed when a message is received. In general, this clo-
sure will be computed anew for each message received, and thus embodies the
current state of the transactor. The transactor primitives are:
new(v) creates a new transactor with behavior v and returns its name.
send(t , v) creates a new message with receiver t and contents v and passes it
to the message delivery system.
ready(v) indicates that the transactor has completed processing the current
message, and is ready to process the next message with behavior v .
quiesce(e) causes the transactor to enter the quiescent volatility state, in
which all future messages are processed with “immutable”, behavior e. A
quiescent transactor may however still roll back due to dependencies on
other transactors. This state is similar to the ﬁrst phase in a two-phase
commit protocol.
stabilize() attempts to change the transactor’s volatility state from qui-
escent to stable; a stable transactor not only has “immutable” behavior,
but will never roll back. This transition is only successful if all transactors
on which the current transactor is dependent are themselves stable. The
primitive yields the value true if the transition is successful, nil otherwise.
rollback() rolls the transactor back to its initial behavior.
volatility() returns the transactor’s volatility state: volatile, quiescent, or
stable.
3.2 Operational Semantics
We give the semantics of transactor expressions by deﬁning a transition re-
lation on conﬁgurations—global snapshots of a set of transactors. We ﬁrst
deﬁne values, expressions, messages, volatility values, dependence maps, and
7
Field and Varela
stability states. Then, we deﬁne a set of operations on transactor dependence
maps. Finally, we deﬁne conﬁgurations and the single-step transition relation
among conﬁgurations.
LetMω[M] be the set of (ﬁnite) multi-sets with elements in M, X0
f→ X1 be
the set of partial ﬁnite maps from X0 to X1, and Dom(f) be the domain of f. For
any function f , f {x → x′} is the function f ′ such that Dom(f ′) = Dom(f)∪
{x}, f ′(y)=f (y) for y=x, y ∈ Dom(f), and f ′(x)=x′. Let ∅, where appropriate,
be the function f such that Dom(f) = ∅, {x → x′} be ∅{x → x′}, and f {x →
x′, y → y′} be f {x → x′}{y → y′}.
3.2.1 Values, Expressions, Messages, Volatility Values, Dependence Maps,
and Stability States
We take as given countable sets At (atoms), X (variables), and N (natural num-
bers). We assume At contains true, nil for booleans, V , Q, and S for volatility
values, as well as integers. Fn is the set of primitive operations of rank n, which
includes arithmetic operations, branching, pairing and transactor primitives
new, send, ready, quiesce, stabilize, rollback, and volatility (ranks
1,2,1,1,0,0, and 0).
Deﬁnition (V,E,M,W,D, S): The set of values, V, the set of expressions,
E, the set of messages, M, the set of volatility values, W, the set of dependence
maps, D, and the set of stability states, S, are deﬁned inductively as follows:
V = At ∪ X ∪ W ∪ λX.E ∪ pr(V,V)
E = V ∪ app(E,E) ∪ Fn(En)
M = <X⇐ V>D
W = {V ,Q,S}
D = X
f→ 〈W,N 〉
S = 〈W,N,E,E,D,D 〉
We use variables for transactor names. A transactor can be either ready
to accept a message, written ready(v), where v is a lambda abstraction de-
noting its behavior; or busy executing an expression, written e. A message
to a transactor with name t , contents v , and dependence map δ, is written
<t ⇐ v>δ. We let w range over {V , Q, S} for transactor volatility values,
representing volatile, quiescent, and stable, respectively. It will be convenient
to assume that volatility values are ordered by V < Q < S. We use natural
numbers for a transactor incarnation—the number of times the transactor has
rolled-back. A dependence map speciﬁes the dependencies for a given trans-
actor: for each transactor that it is dependent on, it maps the name, t , into
〈w , i 〉, which contains its last-known volatility value, w , and its last-known
incarnation value, i . A transactor’s stability state, 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉, rep-
resents a volatility value w , an incarnation value i , an initial behavior ei , a
quiescent/stable behavior eq , a creation dependence map δ0, and a behavior
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(δ0 ⊕ δ1)(t) =


δ0(t) if t /∈ Dom(δ1)∨
(δ0(t) = 〈w0, i0 〉 ∧ δ1(t) = 〈w1, i1 〉 ∧ i0 > i1)
δ1(t) if t /∈ Dom(δ0)∨
(δ0(t) = 〈w0, i0 〉 ∧ δ1(t) = 〈w1, i1 〉 ∧ i0 < i1)
〈max(w0,w1), i 〉 if δ0(t) = 〈w0, i 〉 ∧ δ1(t) = 〈w1, i 〉 ∧ max(w0,w1) < S
undeﬁned otherwise
consis(δ0, δ1) ⇔ ∀t : (δ0(t) = 〈w0, i0 〉 ∧ δ1(t) = 〈w1, i1 〉) ⇒ i0 = i1
inval(δ0, δ1) ⇔ ∃t : (δ0(t) = 〈w0, i0 〉) ∧ (δ1(t) = 〈w1, i1 〉) ∧ (i0 > i1) ∧ (w1 < S)
stable(δ) ⇔ ∀t : δ(t) = 〈w , i 〉 ⇒ w > V
Fig. 2. Deﬁnitions of dependence map operations.
dependence map δ1.
3.2.2 Dependence Maps
Dependence maps carry information regarding a transactor’s creation and
subsequent behavior changes induced by message reception. An empty de-
pendence map, ∅, represents no dependencies on external transactors. Non-
empty dependence maps carried along with messages enable transactors to
determine, in a lazy manner, when partner transactors have rolled-back, po-
tentially causing a local rollback behavior; when partners have become qui-
escent, potentially enabling local stabilization; when partners have become
stable, eﬀectively eliminating dependencies on such partner; when messages
are invalid, due to previously received messages with a larger partner incar-
nation value; or when the sender transactor is a previously unknown partner
eﬀectively creating a new behavior dependence.
In order to facilitate reasoning about dependencies, we require the following
operations on dependence maps:
δ0 ⊕ δ1: union of dependence maps
consis(δ0, δ1): tests if δ0 is consistent with δ1, i.e., it represents a valid in-
coming message
inval(δ0, δ1): tests if δ0 invalidates δ1, i.e., it implies a rollback must happen
in the receiving transactor.
stable(δ): tests if δ enables transactor stabilization, i.e., there are no pending
dependencies on other transactors.
Deﬁnition ( ⊕ , consis(·, ·), inval(·, ·), stable(·)): Given dependence maps
δ, δ0, δ1 ∈ D, we deﬁne the dependence map union, δ0 ⊕ δ1, the consistency
test, consis(δ0, δ1), the invalidating test, inval(δ0, δ1), and the stability test,
stable(δ) as depicted in Fig. 2.
Dependence map union is an associative and commutative operator with ∅
as identity. It represents the new dependence map resulting from combining its
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two operands in such a way that the most up-to-date dependence information
is kept; in particular, notice that if a transactor is known to be stable by either
of the original dependence maps, the union does not deﬁne a mapping for such
stable transactor since by deﬁnition a stable transactor introduces no new
dependencies. The consistency test determines whether two dependence maps
are consistent; inconsistencies could arise from communications with either
older or newer incarnations of a transactor, representing either invalid, out-
of-order messages or transactor rollbacks respectively. The invalidating test
determines whether the ﬁrst dependence map renders the second invalid. A
non-stable transactor is invalidated when it receives a message from a partner
with a new incarnation value. Finally, the stability test succeeds when all
dependencies in a map represent non-volatile transactors.
3.2.3 Transactor Conﬁgurations
A transactor conﬁguration models a transactor system with a transactor state
map, messages in transit, and a transactor stability information map. We
deﬁne transactor conﬁgurations as follows.
Deﬁnition (Transactor Conﬁgurations): A transactor conﬁguration
with transactor state map, τ , multi-set of messages, µ, and stability infor-
mation map, σ, is written
〈
τ µ σ
〉
, where τ ∈ X f→ E, µ ∈ Mω[M],
σ ∈ X f→ S, and Dom(σ) = Dom(τ).
3.2.4 Single-step Transition Relation
There are three kinds of transitions between transactor conﬁgurations:
(i) Local transitions model transactor behavior as in sequential functional
programs
(ii) Transactor transitions model transactor primitive operations - trans-
actor creation, message sending and reception, stabilization, rollback and
quiescence.
(iii) Failure transitions model failures in the computing environment.
The local transition fun is inherited from the purely functional fragment
of our transactor language. The transition represents progress inside a single
transactor.
The transactor transitions are:
new: creation of a transactor, returning its name.
send: message send, passes the message to the mail delivery system.
receive: message reception by a transactor.
quiesce: enters a quiescent state—it becomes ready with self-immutable,
and persistent behavior. It may still rollback due to dependencies from
other transactors.
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stabilize: attempts to become ready with immutable, persistent, and con-
sistent behavior.
rollback: rolls the transactor back to its initial behavior.
volatility: returns the transactor’s volatility state
The failure transitions represent unreliable nodes and networks:
lose: loss of a message due to unreliable communication.
reset: recreation of a transactor state from persistent storage after a hard-
ware reboot.
To describe the transactor transitions between conﬁgurations other than
message receipt, a non-value expression is decomposed into a reduction context
ﬁlled with a redex. Reduction contexts are expressions with a unique hole, and
serve the purpose of identifying the subexpression of an expression that is to
be evaluated next. Reduction contexts correspond to the standard reduction
strategy (left-ﬁrst, call-by-value) of Plotkin [20] and were ﬁrst introduced by
Felleisen and Friedman [10]. We use the symbol ‘ ’ to denote the hole occurring
in a reduction context, and call such holes redex holes.
Deﬁnition (Erdx,R): The set of redexes, Erdx, and the set of reduction
contexts, R, are deﬁned by:
Erdx = app(V,V) ∪ Fn(Vn)
R = { } ∪ app(R,E) ∪ app(V,R) ∪ Fn+m+1(Vn,R,Em)
We let R range over R and r range over Erdx.
An expression e is either a value or it can be decomposed uniquely into a
reduction context ﬁlled with a redex. Thus, local transactor computation is
deterministic.
Lemma (Unique decomposition): Either e ∈ V, or (∃!R, r)(e = R[r ]).
Proof : An easy induction on the structure of e.
The purely functional redexes inherit the operational semantics from the
purely functional fragment of our transactor language. The transactor redexes
are: new(e), send(t , v), ready(v), quiesce(e), stabilize(), rollback(), and
volatility().
Deﬁnition (→): Figures 3 and 4 depict the single-step transition relation
→ on transactor conﬁgurations.
The rules depicted in Fig. 3 describe the behavior of transactors in an ide-
alized world where both networks and processors are perfectly reliable. These
transition rules reﬂect a transactor model with support for global consistent
states by tracking dependencies induced by message passing. Notice that the
semantics does not enforce any particular locking or stabilization algorithm. It
is up to higher-level application layers to provide eﬃcient locking and stabiliza-
tion protocols. The semantics does enforce, however, that once a transactor
becomes stable, its state is consistent with other transactors’ states, and it
11
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<fun>
e
λ→ e′ ⇒
〈
τ{t → e} µ σ
〉
→
〈
τ{t → e′} µ σ
〉
<new>〈
τ{t → R[new(e)]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→
〈
τ{t → R[t ′], t ′ → e} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉, t ′ → 〈V, 0, e, nil, {t → 〈w , i 〉}, ∅ 〉}
〉
t ′ fresh
<send>〈
τ{t → R[send(v0, v1)]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→
〈
τ{t → R[nil]} µ, <v0 ⇐ v1>δ0⊕δ1{t →〈w,i 〉} σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
<receive>〈
τ{t → ready(v)} <t ⇐ v1>δ , µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→


〈
τ{t → app(v , v1)} µ σ{t → 〈V, i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 ⊕ δ 〉}
〉
if w = V, and consis(δ, (δ0 ⊕ δ1{t → 〈w , i 〉}))〈
τ{t → app(eq , v1)} µ σ{t → 〈Q, i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
if w = Q, and consis(δ, (δ0 ⊕ δ1{t → 〈w , i 〉}))〈
τ{t → app(eq , v1)} µ σ{t → 〈S, i , ei , eq , ∅, δ 〉}
〉
if w = S, and consis(δ, (δ0 ⊕ δ1{t → 〈w , i 〉}))〈
τ{t → app(ei , v1)} µ σ{t → 〈V, i + 1 , ei , eq , δ0, δ 〉}
〉
if w = S, and inval(δ, δ1) (rollback)〈
τ µ σ
〉
if w = S, and inval(δ, δ0) (reset)〈
τ{t → ready(v)} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
otherwise (ignore)
<quiesce>〈
τ{t → R[quiesce(e)]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→


〈
τ{t → R[true]} µ σ{t → 〈Q, i , ei , e, δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
if w = V〈
τ{t → R[true]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
otherwise
<stabilize>〈
τ{t → R[stabilize()]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→


〈
τ{t → R[true]} µ σ{t → 〈S, i , nil, eq , ∅, ∅ 〉}
〉
if w = V, and stable(δ0 ⊕ δ1)〈
τ{t → R[nil]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
otherwise
<rollback>〈
τ{t → R[rollback()]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→


〈
τ{t → ei} µ σ{t → 〈V, i + 1 , ei , eq , δ0, ∅ 〉}
〉
if w = V〈
τ{t → R[nil]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
otherwise
<volatility>〈
τ{t → R[volatility()]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→
〈
τ{t → R[w ]} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
Fig. 3. The single-step transition relation → on transactor conﬁgurations (assuming
perfectly reliable networks and processors).
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<lose>〈
τ <t ⇐ v1>δ , µ σ
〉
→
〈
τ µ σ
〉
<reset>〈
τ{t → e} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
→


〈
τ µ σ
〉
if w = V〈
τ{t → eq} µ σ{t → 〈w , i , ei , eq , δ0, δ1 〉}
〉
otherwise
Fig. 4. Additional rules of → modeling potentially unreliable networks and proces-
sors.
becomes immutable and persistent. The semantics also guarantees that once
a transactor becomes quiescent, its state becomes self-immutable and persis-
tent. Furthermore, to quiesce is a local decision and the transactor’s state can
only be rolled back by other transactors’ invalidating messages.
The rules depicted in Fig. 4 model an unreliable network—a network where
messages may get lost, or actors may fail due to computer reboots and crashes.
The <lose> transition represents the loss of a message in the message delivery
system. The <reset> transition represents the loss of a transactor due to
hardware failures. Notice that stable and quiescent transactors recover their
state from persistent storage, while volatile transactors completely disappear.
4 Distributed Transaction Example
Figures 5 and 6 describe a somewhat more realistic and complete transactor
example than that given in Figure 1. In this example, there are two types
of transactors: A BuySell transactor, depicted in Fig. 5 represents an agent
that can either buy or sell a commodity. Typically, two or more BuySell
transactors will interact with one another to complete a sale. The Broker
transactor depicted in Fig. 6 serves to bring two BuySell participants together.
Note that the existence of a “middleman” is not essential; we could have
designed a similar application with direct communication between buyer and
seller, at the cost of some clarity in the speciﬁcation.
The idea of using a chain of transactors to model sequences of committed
states as described in the Counter example of Section 2.1 is used again here
for the committed states of BuySell participants.
A sales transaction is initiated with a participant using the initiate(...)
message processor. As in the Counter example, initiate(...) chains
through a sequence of committed transactors until a volatile transactor is
reached. At this point, the code checks whether the requested inventory and
price adjustments are feasible. If not, the participant informs the broker that
the sale cannot complete, then rolls back. If the transaction is feasible, the
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participant updates its state appropriately, creates a new transactor to handle
subsequent updates, and then executes the quiesce primitive. Once a trans-
actor is quiescent, it may neither update its state nor roll back (the transactor
operational semantics treats assignments or the rollback primitive as no-ops
when the transactor is stable or quiescent). Also, should a quiescent trans-
actor fail, if it ever recovers, it is guaranteed to recover with the state it had
prior to failure. Although a quiescent transactor t1 cannot change its own
state, if it receives a message from another transactor t2 that is inconsistent
with messages received from t2 prior to quiescing (because t2 has rolled back),
t1 will roll back. The quiescent state is thus similar to the “prepared” state
of a 2-phase commit protocol: it indicates that the quiescent transactor is
prepared to commit its current state in a recoverable way, but is also able to
roll back if its partner transactors are unable to complete the transaction.
The Broker transactor in Fig. 6 serves to bring two participants together,
and checks whether both are capable of completing the transaction before
allowing the participants to stabilize. To make the example slightly more
realistic, the Broker also spawns oﬀ an auxiliary Timer transactor, whose sole
purpose is to call the Broker back after a predetermined length of time has
elapsed. If the two BuySell participant transactors do not communicate back
with the Broker before Timer sends the Broker a timeout() message, the
Broker will roll back and abort any active participants.
After a BuySell transactor is quiescent, it waits for a complete sale() or
an abort()message from the Broker. In the former case, the Broker indicates
that all participants are capable of completing the transaction. After receiv-
ing the complete sale() message, the BuySell participant then executes the
stabilize primitive and sends a ping() message to its volatile child. The
dependence information piggybacked on this otherwise vacuous message in-
forms the child transactor that the parent is stable, which is a prerequisite for
the child’s stabilization.
When a BuySell transactor receives an abort() message, it ﬁrst sends a
ping request() message to the Broker. The Broker then replies with an
empty ping() message, which serves to communicate the Broker’s depen-
dence information. Since the Broker rolls back immediately after sending
abort() messages to the BuySell participants, the dependence information
associated with the ping() will force the participant itself to roll back, as a
result of its inconsistency with the (rolled-back) state of the Broker. The use
of the ping request() and ping() messages by the abort() message proces-
sor ensures that the participant will roll back even if it is quiescent (and hence
unable to initiate rollback on its own).
There are a few other aspects of BuySell and Broker that are worth
noting:
• There is nothing to prevent multiple Broker transactors from sending mes-
sages to the same BuySell participant. Thus, e.g., a Broker b1 could ini-
tiate a transaction, while a second Broker b2 could call, e.g., abort() or
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complete sale(). We could explicitly prevent this in various ways, e.g.,
by ensuring that the identity of a participant is only made available to one
broker at a time, or recording the identity of the Broker that initiates a
transaction, recording the Broker’s identity in the participant’s state, then
adding an extra Broker argument to the other message processors as an au-
thentication mechanism to ensure that the only one Broker can participate
in a transaction at a time. However, the transactor operational semantics
will automatically prevent certain forms of misuse; for example, if a Broker
b2 sends the abort() message to a participant involved in a transaction
initiated by Broker b1, the result will be a no-op since abort() only rolls
back the participant’s state if called from a transactor in a state inconsistent
with the dependence information captured by a previous interaction with
the participant.
• As written, Broker is somewhat resilient to a failure to receive messages
from participants, due to the timeout mechanism. However, if a BuySell
participant fails to receive a complete sale() message from a broker, it
could remain in a quiescent, but not stable state indeﬁnitely. A timeout
or message retry mechanism could be added to BuySell to make it more
resilient to failures.
• In general, transactors provide no predeﬁned protocols for stabilization, syn-
chronization, or recovery from message or node failure. Instead, the primi-
tives ensure that interacting transactors never reach mutually inconsistent
states, and provide suﬃcient information to allow a variety of protocols to
achieve consistent (stable) states when needed (but not until needed).
5 Discussion and Future Work
While the transactor semantics of Section 3 is useful for deﬁning key transactor
concepts, it has several shortcomings that we wish to address:
• The structure of dependence information is too coarse for many applica-
tions. For example, when sending a message consisting of a pair of values,
we could in principle decompose the message’s dependence information into
a corresponding pair. If the receiving transactor’s message processor only
reads one element of the pair, no dependences need to be induced on the
unread element. The state of a transactor could also be broken down into
ﬁner-grained elements, with dependences for each element tracked sepa-
rately.
• While we found it convenient for design purposes to base our semantics on
the actor semantics of Agha et al. [3], this semantics does not clearly distin-
guish the immutable “program” controlling a particular transactor from the
“state” of the actor, which can evolve as each message is processed. Both of
these logically distinct concepts are encoded in the same lambda expression.
By adopting a semantics that makes the distinction between these concepts
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// BuySell:
//
// Participant transactor in a sales transaction.
// Assumes that only one broker instance will send
// the participant messages while a transaction is
// being negotiated, and that all messages sent will
// be received.
//
BuySell(int init_inventory, int init_cash_balance) {
// current inventory and cash on hand
int inventory = init_inventory;
int cash_balance = init_cash_balance;
// next_val is non-Null if this value is committed
// (stable); end of chain of transactors rooted at
// next_val yields last committed value
BuySell next_val = Null;
// initiate(broker, inv_adj, cash_adj)
//
// initiate a sales transaction brokered by broker,
// which requests that the participant’s inventory be
// incremented by inv_adj, and that its cash balance
// be incremented by cash_adj
//
initiate(Broker broker, int inv_adj, int cash_adj) {
if ( volatility == stable )
// this is a committed (stable) value; find first
// uncommitted value in chain
next_val.initiate(broker, inv_adj, cash_adj);
} else if (inventory + inventory_adj < 0 ||
cash_balance + cash_adj < 0) {
// inventory and/or cash_balance inadequate to
// complete transaction
broker.no_sale(this);
rollback;
}
else {
inventory += inventory_adj;
cash_balance += cash_adj;
next_val = new BuySell(inventory, cash_balance);
quiesce;
broker.ready(this);
}
}
// complete_sale()
//
// broker uses this message to indicate that
// all parties have agreed to complete the sale
//
complete_sale() {
// the stabilization attempt should always succeed
// when BuySell is used with Broker
stabilize;
// ping child value to communicate stabilized
// status
next_val.ping();
}
// abort()
//
// confirms abort request by sending ping request to
// Broker, which should respond with a ping (see
// below)
//
abort() {
broker.ping_request(this);
}
// ping()
//
// trivial message processor used solely to receive
// (implicit) status information from another
// transactor (here, either another BuySell
// transactor or a Broker transactor); such
// information may cause the transactor to roll
// back (e.g., if Broker has rolled back)
//
ping() {}
}
Fig. 5. Participant in a sale transaction.
clearer, we can, e.g., distinguish “stateless” transactors, whose state does
not change with each message processed, from stateful ones. This distinc-
tion can in turn be used to eliminate certain spurious dependences.
• In general, our model may require that dependence sets of unbounded size
be maintained in a transactor’s volatility state. We conjecture that type
systems or similar annotations could be used to ensure that only bounded
dependence sets need be maintained in many realistic cases.
A number of questions remain open regarding the proposed transactor
model:
• Should a transactor be able to explicitly inspect its dependence information?
• Should a transactor (as opposed to a transactor reference) be a “ﬁrst-class”
value?
• Does a kernel coordination language require explicit support for authenti-
cation (note that the possession of a transactor reference constitutes a sort
of “capability”)?
• Should selective disablement of message processors be supported [13]? (e.g.,
as a locking mechanism for sequences of operations)
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// Broker:
//
// Brings buyer and seller together to perform a sale
// transaction. Assumes that all messages sent will be
// received.
//
Broker(BuySell buyer, BuySell seller,
int num_items, int sale_price)
// flags set to true when participant has
// successfully completed its part of transaction
bool buyer_ready = false;
bool seller_ready = false;
// do_sale()
//
// initiate sale transaction
//
do_sale() {
buyer.initiate(this, num_items, -sale_price);
seller.initiate(this, -num_items, sale_price);
// timer ensures that broker doesn’t wait
// indefinitely for participants to complete their
// part of the transaction
(new Timer()).callBackIn(10, this);
}
// ready(partner)
//
// sent by partner to indicate that it is committed to
// completing its part of the transaction
//
ready(BuySell partner) {
if ( partner == buyer ) buyer_ready = true;
if ( partner == seller ) seller_ready = true;
if ( buyer_ready && seller_ready ) {
// stabilization should succeed at this point,
// because participants are quiescent
stabilize;
buyer.complete_sale();
seller.complete_sale();
system.print("sale successful");
}
}
// no_sale(partner)
//
// sent by partner to indicate that it is unable
// complete its part of the transaction
//
no_sale(BuySell partner) {
if ( partner = buyer ) {
seller.abort();
system.print("buyer aborted sale");
rollback;
}
if ( partner = seller ) {
buyer.abort();
system.print("seller aborted sale");
rollback;
}
}
// ping_request()
//
// implicitly sends Broker’s status (i.e., the
// Broker’s dependence map information) to requester
// using an empty message
//
ping_request(BuySell requester) {
requester.ping()
}
// timeout()
//
// called by auxiliary timer transactor when time to
// complete transaction has elapsed
//
timeout() {
if ( ! (buyer_ready && seller_ready) ) {
// abort sale if participants haven’t responded
buyer.abort();
seller.abort();
system.print("timeout before sale complete");
rollback;
}
}
}
Fig. 6. Broker for a sale transaction.
• What is the right set of high-level “reliable” programming abstractions to
build on top of transactors?
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